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CLASS ACTION LITIGATION AFTER DUKES:
IN SEARCH OF A REMEDY FOR GENDER DISCRIMINATION
IN EMPLOYMENTt
Cindy A. Schipani*
Terry Morehead Dworkin**
In this Article we argue for substantial reforms to our system of combating work-
place gender discrimination in light of the Supreme Court's ruling in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes. To help counter discrimination victims' decreasing access
to the courts, our proposals call for a narrow construction of the holding of Dukes.
At the same time, agencies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs (OFCCP), and the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) can better use their regulatory author-
ity to address gender discrimination. Further, regulatory agencies, arbitrators, and
courts can mandate mentoring programs to assist employees in overcoming the ef-
fects of discrimination and provide a potential pathway for career success.
INTRODUCTION
The recent Supreme Court case, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes,1 is
another in a line of cases over the last few years that limits employee
access to the courts to vindicate important rights, including the
right to be free of workplace discrimination. In Dukes, the Court
denied the plaintiffs' request for class certification in a case involv-
ing claims of systemic gender discrimination in employment
because it failed to see sufficient evidence of commonality among
their claims. 2 Courts have also recently limited plaintiffs' access to
t Copyright 2012, Cindy A. Schipani, Terry Morehead Dworkin. The authors would
like to thank the participants of the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Symposium on Class Action Litigation for their helpful comments.
* Merwin H. Waterman Collegiate Professor & Professor of Business Law, Stephen M.
Ross School of Business, University of Michigan. The authors wish to gratefully acknowledge
the research assistance of Jeff Koelzer, J.D. Candidate, University of Michigan Law School.
** Professor of Business Law, emerita, Indiana University and Visiting Professor of Law,
Seattle University.
1. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
2. See id. at 2550-57; see also infra, Part I.
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the courts by strictly upholding arbitration agreements despite con-
trary state law3 or arbitrator's findings.4 As a result of these types of
decisions, individuals may not be able to afford to prosecute their
individual cases, and issues of public importance receive a limited
spotlight and generate minimal public discussion. At the same
time, studies indicate that gender discrimination, especially at the
highest levels, continues. For example, no women lead the twenty
largest U.S. banks or securities firms, 5 and only 14 percent of senior
executives at Fortune 500 companies are women. 6
In this Article we argue for substantial reforms to our system of
combating workplace gender discrimination in light of the Su-
preme Court's ruling in Dukes. To help counter discrimination
victims' decreasing access to the courts, our proposals call for a nar-
row construction of the holding of Dukes. At the same time,
agencies such as the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC), the Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
(OFCCP), and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) can
better use their regulatory authority to address gender discrimina-
tion. Further, regulatory agencies, arbitrators, and courts can
mandate mentoring programs to assist employees in overcoming
the effects of discrimination and provide a potential pathway for
career success.
Part I is a discussion of the Supreme Court's ruling in Dukes. In
Part II, we articulate proposals for reform, which include a narrow
construction of the holding in Dukes, statutory reform, regulatory
action, preferential awards of government procurement contracts
to businesses with a proven track record of treating employees
fairly, and a ban on mandatory arbitration for claims of employ-
ment discrimination. In this Part, we also advocate that regulators,
as well as courts and arbitrators, require firms to implement
mentoring programs in connection with claims of employment dis-
crimination. Part III follows with concluding remarks.
3. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that the
Federal Arbitration Act preempts California's judicial rule, which invalidates class action
waivers in arbitration agreements in adhesion contracts).
4. See Stolt-Nielson S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010) (holding
that imposing class arbitration on parties who have not agreed to authorize class arbitration is
inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act).
5. Dan Fitzpatrick & Liz Rappaport, Financial Firms' Ceiling: Ouster of BofA s Krawcheck
Highlights Lack of Top Women Executives at Banks, WALL ST. J., Sept. 8, 2011, at Cl.
6. Statistical Overview of Women in the Workplace, CATALYST, (Mar. 13, 2013), http://www.
catalyst.org/file/672/qt~statistical-overview_of_women-inthe-workplace.pdf.
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I. WAL-MART STORES, INC. V. DurEs
Dukes involved allegations by former and current employees of
the retailer Wal-Mart of discrimination in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.7 The plaintiffs sought certification as a
class, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (FRCP or Rule)
23(a)" and Rule 23(b) (2), 9 in an attempt to represent 1.5 million
female employees. 10 The District Court certified the class," and
upon appeal the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed.1 2
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed the ruling of the Court
of Appeals, citing three grounds.' 3
The first ground related to the commonality requirement of
Rule 23.14 The Court found that the plaintiffs had not presented
sufficient evidence to support their claim that the company oper-
ated under a general policy of discrimination. 15 That is, the
putative class failed to provide "significant proof"16 that Wal-Mart
exercised a general policy of discrimination, as required to satisfy
the commonality prerequisite for class certification under FRCP
23(a) (2).17
Second, the Court held that class certification for claims of back
pay was also inappropriate under FRCP 23(b) (2), 1 which permits
class certification only for claims of injunctive or declaratory relief.
Finally, the Court stated that the claims for back pay were not "inci-
dental" to the claims for injunctive and declaratory relief and
therefore found Wal-Mart was entitled to litigate each of those
claims for back pay separately under Title VJI. 19 These claims are
discussed below.
7. 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2547 (2011).
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
10. SeeWal-Martv. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2546-47 (2011).
11. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 143 (N.D. Cal. 2004), aff'd en banc,
603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
12. Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 577 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc), rev'd,
131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
13. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2545-46.
14. See id. at 2550, 2556-57.
15. See id. at 2553-57.
16. Id. at 2545.
17. Id. at 2556-57.
18. Id. at 2557.
19. Id.
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A. Certification Denied under FRCP 23(a)(2): Lack of Commonality
In order to be certified as a class, plaintiffs must satisfy a two-part
test. First, they must meet the prerequisite requirements of FRCP
23(a).2 0 In this case, the criterion at issue was the commonality ele-
ment of Rule 23(a) (2).21 If all requirements are satisfied, the
putative class then must fit one of the categories of Rule 23(b) .22
The Dukes Court found that the plaintiffs' purported class did not
meet the requirements of either FRCP 23(a) 23 or 23(b).2 4
In their motion for class certification, the Dukes plaintiffs
presented three forms of proof: statistical evidence about pay and
promotion disparities between men and women, anecdotal reports
of discrimination from about 120 of Wal-Mart's female employees,
the testimony of a sociologist whose study of "social framework anal-
ysis" of Wal-Mart's "culture" and personnel practices concluded
that the company was "vulnerable" to gender discrimination.2 5
First, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not meet the prerequi-
site requirements for class certification under FRCP 23(a). 26
Specifically, the Court held that the plaintiffs did not meet the com-
monality requirement of Rule 23(a) (2).27 FRCP 23(a) (2) states
that: "[o]ne or more members of a class may sue or be sued as
representative parties on behalf of all members only if... there are
questions of law or fact common to the class.... .28 The Court held
commonality requires that the class members suffered a common
injury, not merely that they suffered a violation of the same law.2 9
The Court went on to say that plaintiffs bringing gender discrimi-
nation claims can meet the burden of proving commonality in two
ways. 30 First, they can show that an employer used a biased testing
20. See id at 2548.
21. See id. at 2550-51.
22. Id. at 2548.
23. See id. at 2550-57.
24. Id. at 2557.
25. Id. at 2549 (citing Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 603 F.3d 571, 601 (9th Cir. 2010)
(en banc)).
26. Id. at 2550-57.
27. Id. at 2556-57.
28. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(2).
29. The Court explained the test for commonality:
Their claims must depend upon a common contention-for example, the assertion of
discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor. That common contention,
moreover, must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution-which
means that determination of its truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to
the validity of each one of the claims in one stroke.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551.
30. Id. at 2552-53.
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procedure to evaluate candidates for employment or promotion.
Testing procedures were not at issue in this case, however.31 Sec-
ond, plaintiffs can provide "[s]ignificant proof that an employer
operated under a general policy of discrimination [which] conceiv-
ably could justify a class of both applicants and employees if the
discrimination manifested itself in hiring and promotion practices
in the same general fashion, such as through entirely subjective de-
cision-making processes."3 2  The only evidence the plaintiffs
presented of a general policy of discrimination was that of the soci-
ology expert who found Wal-Mart's corporate culture "vulnerable
to gender bias."33 The plaintiffs' expert was, however, unable to de-
termine how regularly stereotypes play a meaningful role in
Wal-Mart's employment decisions. 34 The Court thus found the
plaintiffs' evidence unpersuasive.3 5
The Court was also unconvinced by the plaintiffs' argument that
Wal-Mart's policy of allowing discretion by local supervisors over
employment matters was discriminatory under a disparate impact
theory.36 The Court reasoned that a policy of lower-level discretion
does not tend to prove company-wide discrimination, because
"demonstrating the invalidity of one manager's use of discretion
will do nothing to demonstrate the invalidity of another's."37
Furthermore, the Court found that statistical evidence of dispa-
rate pay and promotion "cannot by itself establish the uniform,
store-by-store disparity upon which the plaintiffs' theory of com-
monality depends. 38 Additionally, even if the statistical evidence
did show a discriminatory pay or promotion pattern, the plaintiffs
would still need to identify a "specific employment practice '39 in
order to show commonality, and they had not done so. 40 Moreover,
the anecdotal evidence offered by the plaintiffs was "too weak to
raise any inference that all the individual, discretionary personnel
decisions are discriminatory. ''41 The Court was unpersuaded by the
31. See id. at 2553 (citing Gen. Tel. Co. of Sw. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 159 n.15 (1982)).
32. Id. (quoting Falcon, 457 U.S. at 159 n.15).
33. Id. at 2545 (quoting Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 222 F.R.D. 137, 154 (N.D. Cal.
2004), affd en banc 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), rev'd, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011)).
34. Id. at 2553 (quoting Dukes, 222 F.R.D. at 192).
35. See id. at 2554.
36. See id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 2555.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 2555-56.
41. Id. at 2556.
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120 anecdotal reports presented because they represented only one
out of every 12,500 class members.42
B. Certification for Claims of Back Pay Denied Under FRCP 23(b)(2)
Next, the Court held that the plaintiffs' claims for back pay were
improperly certified under Rule 23(b) (2), which provides that:
A class action may be maintained if Rule 23 (a) is satisfied and
if ... the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act
on grounds that apply generally to the class, so that final in-
junctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief is
appropriate respecting the class as a whole . . .43
In short, the Court held that because the claims for back pay were
individualized and not a form of declaratory or injunctive relief for
the class as a whole, plaintiffs did not satisfy the second require-
ment for class certification under Rule 23.44
The plaintiffs argued that because their claims for monetary re-
lief did not predominate over their requests for injunctive and
declaratory relief, the back pay claims were properly certified under
42. Thus, on the issue of commonality under 23(a) (2), the Court concluded that:
Because respondents provide no convincing proof of a companywide discrimina-
tory pay and promotion policy, we have concluded that they have not established the
existence of any common question.
In sum, we agree with Chief Judge Kozinski [the author of the dissenting opinion
for the Court of Appeals] that the members of the class: "held a multitude of different
jobs, at different levels of Wal-Mart's hierarchy, for variable lengths of time, in 3,400
stores, sprinkled across 50 states, with a kaleidoscope of supervisors (male and fe-
male), subject to a variety of regional policies that all differed .... Some thrived while
others did poorly. They have little in common but their sex and this lawsuit."
Id. at 2556-57 (citing Dukes v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 603 F. 3d 571, 652 (9th Cir. 2010) (en
banc) (KozinskiJ., dissenting)).
43. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). The Dukes Court said that:
[A] t a minimum, claims for individualized relief (like the backpay at issue here) do not
satisfy the Rule .... Rule 23(b)(2) applies only when a single injunction or declara-
tory judgment would provide relief to each member of the class. It does not authorize
class certification when each individual class member would be entitled to a different
injunction or declaratory judgment against the defendant. Similarly, it does not au-
thorize class certification when each class member would be entitled to an
individualized award of monetary damages.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2557.
44. See id. at 2545. The Court went on to say that claims for individual monetary relief
belong under FRCP 23(b)(3).
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23(b) (2). 4 5 The Court, however, disagreed, finding no textual basis
for this "predominat[ion]" interpretation of the rule.46
Additionally, the Court noted that this interpretation of the rule
would have negative practical consequences. First, it would give
class representatives incentives to forego potentially valid monetary
claims. For example, in this case plaintiffs decided to pursue only
back pay instead of compensatory damages, fearing that compensa-
tory damages would "predominate" the injunctive and declaratory
claims and preclude class certification. 47 Second, district courts
would constantly need to reevaluate the roster of class members. In
this case, once an employee left Wal-Mart, she would no longer be
entitled to the injunctive relief and thus no longer eligible for the
class. 48
The plaintiffs also argued that because the back pay relief they
sought was equitable in nature, it should qualify for class certifica-
tion under Rule 23(b) (2) .49 But the Court dismissed this claim as
well, noting that the Rule specifically refers to injunctions and de-
claratory judgments, not equitable remedies generally.50 The Court
also noted that the plaintiffs' claims for back pay do not qualify as
"incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory relief' under
23(b) (2),51 although the plaintiffs did not argue this. 52
C. Aftermath
The decision in Dukes has engendered a flurry of commentary.
For one commentator, Dukes is a "watershed case for employment
law practitioners and class action litigators .... Dukes ensures that
future class certifications will prove far more infrequent-and more
expensive-than in the pre-Dukes era."53 One went further, stating
that the majority opinion is "premised on a frank hostility to class
actions and an expressed desire to protect big business" and that
45. Id. at 2545-46.
46. See id. at 2559.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 2559-60.
49. Id. at 2560.
50. Id.
51. Id. (quoting Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 415 (5th Cir. 1998)).
52. See id. The Court further stated that "Wal-Mart is entitled to individualized determi-
nations of each employee's eligibility for backpay," as prescribed by Title VII, contrary to the
"Trial by Formula" proposed by the Court of Appeals. Id. at 2560-61.
53. John M. Husband & Bradford J. Williams, Wal-Mart v. Dukes Redux: The Future of the
Sprawling Class Action, 40 CoLo. LAw. 53, 59 (2011).
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"[f] rom the legal process perspective, the activism of these two deci-
sions is stunning."5 4  Further criticizing the ruling, another
commentator agreed that the majority "showed little regard for the
interest of employees and considerable concern for the burdens
that such actions might place on employers. '55
Yet, not all commentators are as critical of the decision. For ex-
ample, another contends Dukes "has not doomed the class
action .... All it has done is make the game of certification a little
fiercer. ' 56 Another agreed, stating that Dukes "effectively reinvigo-
rated" requirements of certification, "which had been treated by
some courts as very easy to satisfy."57
One author indirectly defended the opinion, stating that the
Ninth Circuit "created an unmanageable class and undermined the
efficiency and fairness goals of Rule 23's commonality require-
ment." a5 Another commentator argues that the result was due to
the failure of the plaintiffs' counsel "to grapple with many difficult
doctrinal and policy problems underlying structural class actions " 59
and should not be viewed as a "major blow to working women
across America. '6 0
Another question related to the Dukes decision involves whether
a court may certify a class action without determining whether the
case is susceptible to damages on a class-wide basis. In Comcast Corp.
v Behrend,61 the plaintiffs alleged that Comcast acted anti-competi-
tively when it entered into a series of acquisition and "swap"
agreements with other cable providers.6 2  In these agreements,
54. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: Wal-Mart v.
Dukes andAT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DuKFJ. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 73, 96-97 (2011).
55. L. Camille H6bert, The Supreme Court's 2010-2011 Labor and Employment Law Decisions:
A Large and "Mixed Bag"for Employers and Employees, 15 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'YJ. 279, 280
(2011).
56. AndrewJ. Trask, Wal-Mart v. Dukes: Class Actions and Legal Strategy, 2010-2011 CATO
SuP. CT. REv. 319, 355 (2011).
57. Mac R. McCoy & D. Matthew Allen, Taming the Kraken: The Supreme Court Weighs in on
Class Actions in 2011, Bus. L. TODAY, Jan. 23, 2012, at 1, http://apps.americanbar.org/bus-
law/blt/content/2012/01/article-l-mccoy-allen.pdf.
58. Kathryn Smith, Comment, What Do 1.5 Million Wal-Mart Women Have in Common?:
Dukes v. Wal-Mart Class Action Certification, 52 B.C.L. Rv. E. Supp. 149, 157 (2011), available
at http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/cgi/viewcon ten t.cgi?article=3203&context=bclr.
59. Deborah M. Weiss, A Grudging Defense ofWal-Mart v. Dukes, 24 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
119, 121 (2012).
60. See id. at 174. Contra Courmey Martin, Wal-Mart v. Dukes Ruling is Out of Sync with
21st-Century Sex Discrimination, Ci4RisTiAN Sci. MONrrOR (June 22, 2011), http://www.
csmonitor.com/Commentary/Opinion/2011/0622/Wal-Mart-v.-Dukes-ruling-is-out-of-sync-
with-21st-century-sex-discrimination.
61. 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).
62. Id. at 1430.
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Comcast either acquired competing cable companies in the Phila-
delphia Designated Market Area or exchanged cable systems it
owned outside the Philadelphia area for competitor cable systems
inside of the Philadelphia Designated Market Area. 63 Through
these agreements, Comcast allegedly increased its share of subscrib-
ers in the area from 23.9 percent in 1998 to 69.5 percent in 2007.64
The plaintiffs claim anti-competitive harm from these agreements
alleging they "eliminate[ed] competition and [held] prices for
cable services above competitive levels."6 5 Plaintiffs sought class ac-
tion certification.66
In a typical antitrust case, the complainant does not need to pro-
vide evidence to support claims of anti-competitive behavior during
the pleadings stage; rather, the pleadings only need to provide
"enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will
reveal evidence of illegal agreement."67 Yet, in Behrend, the United
States Supreme Court denied class certification because plaintiffs'
evidence failed to show that the claims were susceptible to damages
on a class-wide basis for class certification. 68 This evidentiary burden
at the pleadings stage may further limit the accessibility of the class
action procedure.
In addition, in Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Knowles,69 the plain-
tiff alleged that the insurance company breached its contract with
policy holders by failing to pay for general contractors' overhead
and profit associated with home repairs covered under their poli-
cies. 70 The insurance company attempted to remove the case to
federal court, offering evidence that the aggregate damages to the
putative class would be greater than the $5 million maximum
threshold for state court,71 thereby giving the federal courts original
jurisdiction. 72 In order to remain in state court, the plaintiff stipu-
lated that he would not seek damages in excess of $5 million on
behalf of the class. 73 The District Court held that this stipulation
63. Id.
64. Id
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Bell At. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). See generally FED. R. Crv. P. 8
(detailing general rules of pleading).
68. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. at 1432-33.
69. 133 S. Ct. 1345 (2013).
70. Id. at 1347.
71. Id. at 1348.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction
of any civil action in which the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in which any member of a class of plain-
tiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant .
73. Knowles, 133 S. Ct. at 1347-48.
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was legally binding and satisfied the plaintiffs burden of proving
with legal certainty that his claim falls under the $5 million thresh-
old for remand to state court.7 4 Then the defendant insurance
company petitioned the Supreme Court to decide whether the
plaintiffs stipulation was sufficient to destroy federal jurisdiction. 7-
The Supreme Court held that the stipulation was not binding and
therefore did not eliminate federal court jurisdiction.7 6 This deci-
sion may serve yet another blow to the utility of class actions for
plaintiffs who lack the resources to pursue claims independently. It
restricts the ability of class action plaintiffs to opt for presumably
less restrictive state law by stipulating they would not seek recovery
of over $5 million.
II. PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
The Dukes holding has made it significantly more difficult for vic-
tims of workplace gender discrimination to fight for their rights in
court. With class certifications becoming more difficult to attain,
potential plaintiffs with limited resources may be unable to afford
to bring lawsuits, and, as a result, corporations with company-wide
discrimination problems may not be held accountable for the dam-
age they cause. To ameliorate this problem, we (1) encourage
courts to narrowly construe the decision, as some courts have done;
(2) encourage Congress to create statutory exceptions to the com-
monality requirement and enact legislation to bar enforcement of
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements and conditions of
employment that prohibit employees from joining class actions; (3)
call for government agencies such as the EEOC, the OFCCP, and
the SEC to better use their regulatory power to provide remedies
for claimants affected by employment discrimination, including
mandating adoption of mentoring programs to help rectify past dis-
crimination and provide a pathway for career success; and (4)
encourage the government to preferentially award procurement
and services contracts to businesses that have superior track records
for treating women properly.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 1348-49.
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A. Narrowing the Holding of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes
Although the Dukes decision would appear to severely limit the
availability of the class action mechanism in cases involving employ-
ment discrimination, some courts have found limits to its
application. For example, in Ramos v. SimplexGrinnell LP, 7 7 rather
than attempting to show a uniform discriminatory policy when
seeking class certification, the plaintiffs satisfied the commonality
requirement by showing a uniform lack of a policy preventing dis-
crimination. 78 In Johns v. Bayer Corp.,79 the court certified the
plaintiffs' class after rejecting defendant's argument that the indi-
vidual defenses it planned to raise should preclude certification.
The court found that class certification would not prevent the de-
fendant from presenting individual defenses to individual claims.8 0
We encourage future courts to similarly apply Dukes narrowly to
avoid foreclosing an important remedy for those who have suffered
harm. The decisions in Ramos and Bayer Corp. are discussed below.
1. Uniform Lack of a Policy Preventing Discrimination
In Ramos v. SimplexGrinnell LP,8 ' employees sought to distinguish
a company's routine failures to comply with statutory pay rates from
its local managers' discretionary pay. 2 The court, by distinguishing
the claims from those in Dukes, certified a class of employees who
were denied the "prevailing wages"8 3 to which they were entitled
under state law.
With regard to the issue of commonality, the Ramos plaintiffs
showed that they "were paid the same wages for their work on pub-
lic and private projects and did not receive prevailing wages for
their work on public job sites."8 4 Additionally, they "also submitted
evidence indicating that defendant's payroll procedures were cen-
tralized."8 5 The company argued that because it lacked a uniform
77. 796 F. Supp. 2d 346 (E.D.N.Y. 2011).
78. See id. at 355.
79. 280 F.R.D. 551 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
80. Id. at 560 (citing Godec v. Bayer Corp., No. 1:10-CV-224, 2011 WL 5513202, at *7
(N.D. Ohio Nov. 11, 2011)).
81. 796 F. Supp. 2d 346.
82. Id. at 355.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 354.
85. Id.
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procedure for denying prevailing wages, there was no commonal-
ity.8 6 But the court found the offices were uniform in their failure
to guarantee that prevailing wages were paid, and thus the evidence
satisfied the commonality requirement.
The Ramos court found four ways to distinguish the Dukes deci-
sion from the case before it. First, the court said that unlike the
promotion and pay decisions in Dukes, which were made indepen-
dently by numerous local managers with broad discretion, in this
case there was evidence that the defendant "routinely failed to ac-
count for labor performed on public works projects and pay
prevailing wages for covered work. '8 7 Second, whereas the manag-
ers in Dukes retained some discretion to make wage and payment
decisions, SimplexGrinnell, the defendant in Ramos, had no discre-
tion or subjective judgment when determining whether to pay
prevailing wages on public projects. The right to prevailing wages
arose automatically, by operation of law.88 Third, Wal-Mart, -the de-
fendant in Dukes, had an official policy prohibiting discrimination,
but the defendant Ramos did not have an "expressed uniform policy
that ensured the payment of prevailing wages to its employees when
due."8' 9 Finally, although the statistical evidence used by the plain-
tiffs in Wal-Mart failed to prove commonality, the plaintiffs in Ramos
had evidence from the defendant's electronic data that was "suffi-
ciently reliable to be presented at trial."90
Future claimants might succeed in attaining class certification by
urging a similar reading of the commonality requirement of Rule
23(a). That is, depending on the nature of the claim, it might be
possible to show a common thread in the nature of the harm in-
flicted as opposed to showing commonality in the harm incurred.
In Ramos, the commonality shown was the failure to pay prevailing
wages even though the pay processes leading to the harms were not
the same for all plaintiffs. 91 Additionally, future plaintiffs should
focus their allegations on aspects of the employer's behavior that
fail to prevent discriminatory practices from occurring. For exam-
ple, plaintiffs could cite gaps in enforcement of a company's stated
anti-discrimination policies, or a lack of such policies altogether.
Finally, plaintiffs should present more complete statistical evidence
in order to prove any alleged systemic failures in discrimination
prevention.
86. Id. at 355.
87. Id. at 356.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 355.
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2. Individual Defenses
In seeking to certify a class, it may be helpful for plaintiffs to
show that class certification will not prevent the defendant from
presenting individual defenses to individual claims. 92 In Johns v.
Bayer Corp.,93 for instance, the plaintiffs, consumers of certain vita-
mins marketed to men to support prostate health, alleged that the
defendant's advertising claims regarding the health effects of its vi-
tamins violated the California Unfair Competition Law and the
Consumers Legal Remedies Act.94 The court granted class certifica-
tion, finding the plaintiffs had met the prerequisites of Rules 23(a)
and 23(b) (3).95
In this case, Bayer attempted to analogize its defense against class
certification to the successful defense in Dukes by claiming that class
certification would deprive it of the opportunity to prove defenses
to individual claims.96 In this regard, Bayer claimed that there were
some members of the purported class who had not relied on the
alleged illegal health claims and would thus not be entitled to re-
covery.9 7 The court, however, found that certifying the class would
not prevent Bayer from presenting this or any other defense to indi-
vidual claims, and ruled in favor of class certification. 98
Future plaintiffs seeking class certification might similarly at-
tempt to rebut claims that individual defenses should preclude class
action certification by showing that certification would not impair
defendants' ability to raise defenses to the individual claims. This
may require carefully couching the complaint allegations in terms
that are applicable to all members of the class. Additionally, if pos-
sible, plaintiffs should consider bringing class actions under Rule
23(b) (3) if they are able to argue that a class action is the only
suitable means of adjudicating the controversy because common
questions of law and fact predominate over any defenses pertaining
only to individual class members. 99
92. Johns v. Bayer Corp., 280 F.R.D. 551, 560 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Godec v. Bayer
Corp., No. 1:10-CV-224, 2011 WL 5513202, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 11, 2011)).
93. Id.
94. See id. at 554.
95. Id. at 556.
96. Id. at 560.
97. Id.
98. Id. ("[T]o the extent Bayer has individualized defenses, it is free to try those de-
fenses against individual claimants." (quoting Godec v. Bayer Corp., No. 1:10-CV-224, 2011
WL 5513202, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 11, 2011))).
99. See Godec, 2011 WL 5513202, at *7 (saying that although defendant Bayer "may have
defenses applicable to some class members and not others, those defenses do not
predominate," and therefore class resolution was still appropriate, adding that "[i]n any
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B. Statutory Exceptions to the Commonality Requirement
Congress could create a statutory exception to the commonality
requirement of Rule 23 for victims of systemic employment discrim-
ination, thereby making it easier for them to attain class
certification. For example, a statute could provide employees
claiming violations of Title VII of the type alleged in Dukes the right
to maintain an action against any employer on behalf of themselves
and any other similarly situated plaintiffs.
A statute of this type currently exists to enforce the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA).100 Rather than showing "commonality"
under Rule 23(a), plaintiffs seeking class certification of claims
brought under the FLSA only need to show that their claims are
"similarly situated." For example, in Creely v. HCR ManorCare, Inc.,
workers at assisted living facilities alleged denial of statutory over-
time pay in violation of the FLSA.10  The defendant, HCR
ManorCare, Inc., used a timecard system that automatically de-
ducted a thirty-minute lunch period from employees who worked
shifts longer than five or six hours.10 2 The plaintiffs claimed that
this system illegally shifted the burden of monitoring "compensable
work time" to individual employees, requiring employees to notify a
supervisor if they did not take an uninterrupted thirty-minute lunch
break.'0 3
According to the Creely court, the Dukes decision had' no bearing
on the FLSA claims.104 Because the claim in this case was brought
under the FLSA, the standard for class certification only required
that the putative class be composed of "similarly situated" individu-
als.105 Plaintiffs are "similarly situated" where "'claims [are] unified
by common theories of defendants' statutory violations,' even
though 'proof of a violation as to one particular plaintiff [does] not
[necessarily] prove that the defendant violated any other plaintiffs
rights.' "106
event, to the extent Bayer has individualized defenses, it is free to try those defenses against
individual claimants.").
100. Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (2006).
101. 789 F. Supp. 2d 819, 821 (N.D. Ohio. 2011).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Creelyv. HCR ManorCare, Inc., Nos. 3:09 CV 2879, 3:10 CV 417, 3:10 CV 2200, 2011
WL 3794142 (N.D. Ohio July 1, 2011).
105. Creely, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 823.
106. Creely, 2011 WL 3794142, at *1 (citing O'Brien v. Ed Donnelly Enters., 575 F.3d 567,
585 (6th Cir. 2009)). This standard differs significantly from the commonality standard ar-
ticulated by the Supreme Court in Dukes:
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The "similarly situated" standard thus appears far easier to meet
than the commonality standard articulated by the Supreme Court
in Dukes.10 7 Therefore, using a "similarly situated" standard for class
certification of Title VII plaintiffs rather than requiring a "common
contention capable of classwide resolution" may allow more victims
of employment discrimination to have their day in court.
Although the FLSA standard for class certification is easier to
meet than the Rule 23 standard, it is not a panacea for the victims
of widespread illegal employment practices. In another recent case
against Wal-Mart, Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores Inc.,'0 8 the Third Circuit
affirmed the District Court's decision to deny class certification
under the FLSA to a group of undocumented immigrant cleaning
crew members alleging RICO violations and false imprisonment.1 0 9
The plaintiff workers, who "worked at dozens of different stores, for
numerous different contractors, with various pay amounts and
methods,"' 10 attempted to prove that they were similarly situated via
a comprehensive Wal-Mart Maintenance Manual, "which appears to
establish uniform standards and procedures for cleaning Wal-Mart
stores," such as the products and methods to be used and the pro-
cedures for obtaining new supplies."' The plaintiffs also alleged
that, though they worked for separate contractors, Wal-Mart store
managers had actual control over them, with the power to approve,
fire, and manage the cleaning crew members, and that the workers
Their claims must depend upon a common contention-for example, the assertion of
discriminatory bias on the part of the same supervisor. That common contention, moreo-
ver, must be of such a nature that it is capable of classwide resolution-which means that
determination of its truth orfalsity will resolve an issue that is central to the validity of each one
of the claims in one stroke.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (emphasis added).
The court in Creely differentiated the nature of the claims from the claims in Dukes. Dukes
involved "an examination of the subjective intent behind millions of individual employment
decisions," whereas the Creely court was concerned with "whether the company-wide policies,
as implemented, violated Plaintiffs' statutory rights." Creely, 2011 WL 3794142, at *1.
Dukes held that the class was also improperly certified under FRCP 23(b) (2) because the
plaintiffs' individual claims for back pay monetary damages predominated. See Dukes, 131 S.
Ct. at 2557. Thus, the absence of notice and opt-out procedures under Rule 23(b) (2), as
opposed to those required by Rule 23(c)(2) (B) for Rule 23(b)(3) classes, violated the due
process rights of the plaintiffs. Creely, 2011 WL 3794142, at *1. These concerns are not rele-
vant to a FLSA claim because the FLSA has built-in procedures to ensure that plaintiffs may
preserve their individual claims. Id.
107. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2551 (emphasis added).
108. 691 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 2012).
109. Id. at 530.
110. Id. at 531.
111. Id. at 532.
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were all victims of a "common scheme to hire and underpay illegal
immigrant workers."' 1 2
The Third Circuit left undisturbed the District Court's finding
that these arguments were unpersuasive, noting that "the putative
class members worked in 180 different stores in thirty-three states
throughout the country and for seventy different contractors and
subcontractors," and that hours and wages varied depending on the
contractor.11 3 Additionally, the Court said that different individual
defenses might be available to Wal-Mart with respect to each pro-
posed plaintiff.1 4 Altogether, this evidence, similar to the evidence
cited by the Supreme Court in Dukes to deny class certification, ' 5
convinced the Third Circuit to deny final class certification on the
grounds that the plaintiffs were not similarly situated. Thus, be-
cause of the inherent challenges of proving similarities among
employees from several different stores over a wide geographical
area, adopting a more relaxed standard for class certification may
still leave some victims of large-scale gender discrimination without
accessible means of relief.
Of course, expanding the availability of class actions is neither
desirable nor practical in every context, such as when a highly indi-
vidualized inquiry is unavoidable in order to determine the merits
of a claim. For example, in Basile v. H&R Block,116 the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court decertified a putative class of H&R Block customers
who alleged breach of fiduciary duties as a result of the company's
"Rapid Refund" program.1 1 7 The plaintiffs alleged that, through
marketing and other companywide practices, H&R Block gained
the trust of its low-income customers, thus forming a confidential
relationship with them, and then subsequently breached the fiduci-
ary duties it owed by failing to adequately disclose that the
"refunds" paid out under the program were actually high-interest
loans.118 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that class certifica-
tion was inappropriate because whether a given customer had a
confidential relationship with the company, and thus whether a
breach of fiduciary duty was even possible, was a fact-intensive ques-
tion individual to each class member.11 9
112. Id. at 538.
113. Id. (quoting Zavala v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., CA No. 03-5309 (GEB), 2010 WL
2652510, at *3 (D.NJ.June 25, 2010), affd sub nom, Zavala v. Wal Mart Stores Inc., 691 F.3d
527 (2012)).
114. Id. at 538.
115. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2557, 2561 (2011).
116. 52 A.3d 1202 (Pa. 2012).
117. Id. at 1211-12.
118. Id. at 1208.
119. Id. at 1210-11.
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Yet, the claims of the plaintiffs in cases like Dukes do not require
such a highly individualized inquiry for resolution. Rather than re-
quiring proof of how each individual class member relates to the
defendant, resolution of a large-scale employment discrimination
case requires proof that the defendant operated under a general
policy of discrimination that was against the law. 120 This defendant-
focused inquiry makes class actions more appropriate in discrimina-
tion suits than, for example, fiduciary duty-based consumer claims.
Accordingly, a relaxed standard, limited to Tide VII discrimination
claims akin to the "similarly situated" standard of the FLSA, may be
desirable.
Congress should evaluate whether, when plaintiffs allege employ-
ment discrimination against a particular employer, their ability to
assert their claims as a class should be more restrictive than that of
plaintiffs asserting violations of the FLSA. If not, we propose that
Congress consider changing the "commonality" requirement in
claims for employment discrimination to the "similarly situated"
standard of FLSA claims.
C. Regulatory Actions
Employment discrimination claims are handled by a number of
different government agencies. The Equal Employment Opportu-
nity Commission enforces a number of federal employment
discrimination statutes, including Tide VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964,121 the Equal Pay Act of 1963,122 the Age Discrimination Em-
ployment Act, 123 and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.124 The Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs
(OFCCP), a division of the Department of Labor, enforces Execu-
tive Order 11246, which prohibits federal contractors from
discriminating on various bases. 125 The Department of Education
enforces Tide IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, which
120. See Dukes, 131 S. Ct. at 2553.
121. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006) (prohibiting employment discrimination on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin).
122. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2006) (prohibiting pay discrimination between sexes).
123. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis
of age).
124. 29 U.S.C. §§ 791-794f (2006) (prohibiting employment discrimination against indi-
viduals with disabilities in the federal sector).
125. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965) (prohibiting discrimi-
nation by federal government contractors).
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prohibits sex discrimination against employees in educational insti-
tutions that receive federal financial assistance. 26  Most
employment discrimination claims are brought under Title VII-
and thus enforced by the EEOC-because Title VII is very broad,
encompassing private employers and discrimination on several dif-
ferent bases, including sex and race. 127 Additionally, the other
agencies tend to follow the lead of the EEOC in discrimination
matters.
The EEOC's procedure for handling Title VII claims begins
when a charge of employment discrimination is filed by a victim.
The EEOC then sends a notice and copy of the charge to the em-
ployer 128 and then frequently suggests the parties partake in
mediation. If the claim is not resolved through mediation, the
EEOC will undertake an investigation. 29 If during the investigation
the EEOC finds a violation of law, it will attempt to reach a settle-
ment with the employer. If no settlement is reached, the EEOC
may decide to file a lawsuit. If the EEOC does not file a lawsuit, or
if the investigation did not reveal a violation of law, then the EEOC
will send the victim a Notice-of-Right-to-Sue, allowing the victim to
pursue a lawsuit on his or her own behalf.130
1. Power of the EEOC-Mentoring Programs
To specifically help women who have faced employment discrim-
ination, mentoring programs could be integrated into the
mediation stage of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion's (EEOC's) complaint process. 131 If the EEOC placed an
emphasis on mentoring as an option for settlement, the resulting
programs would benefit not only the employees who filed the com-
plaint, but also other victims of discrimination who do not have the
resources to pursue a discrimination claim outside of a class action.
As noted above, the underrepresentation of women in boar-
drooms and executives offices is well documented. The lack of
coaching and grooming for women who seek these positions is a
126. 34 C.F.R. § 106.51 (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of sex at
any educational institution receiving federal financial assistance).
127. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006).
128. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006).
129. Id.
130. See 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(f)(1) (2006).
131. Currently, after an employee files a charge with the EEOC, the EEOC will often
suggest that the employer and employees participate in mediation. Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion Policy Statement, U.S. EQUAL EMP'T OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/
docs/adrstatement.html (last visited Mar. 12, 2013).
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major factor in that underrepresentation. 32 Another recent report
of a study, involving 2,525 college-educated men and women, over
half of whom were in large companies, cited inadequate career de-
velopment as the primary reason women have not reached the top
rungs of the corporate ladder. 133 Mentoring programs, when struc-
tured correctly, can and do play a central role in fostering talent
and grooming both male and female employees for leadership
positions.
Research in organizational behavior and other social science dis-
ciplines has established a significant knowledge base about
mentoring for both men and women, including a rich theoretical
base grounded in psychology and sociology. 34 Mentoring pro-
grams can be effective in helping women chart pathways around
the barriers to leadership for a variety of reasons. 35 Legitimacy is
enhanced because someone successful from a higher level in the
organization (the mentor) is seen helping the mentee be success-
ful, which, assumedly, shows that the mentor thinks the mentee has
potential. 36 Additionally, mentors buffer an individual from overt
and covert forms of discrimination, even discrimination they may
not consciously realize exists.13 7 A mentor can compensate for ex-
clusion from organizational networks where important information
is usually found. They can provide reflected power by signaling
that an individual has a powerful sponsor.13s They can even in-
crease self-confidence and facilitate career goals. 13 9
Some studies indicate that the impact of mentoring is greatest
for women in male-dominated professions and industries, especially
if they have a powerful male mentor.1 40 Male-dominated industries
are ones characterized by female underrepresentation or by aggres-
sive, engineering-intensive, competitive, "up-or-out" corporate
132. See Fitzpatrick & Rappaport, supra note 5.
133. Joann S. Lublin, Coaching Urged for Women: Inadequate Career Development Holds Back
Female Executives, McKinsey Says, WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2011, at B8.
134. See generally THE HANDBOOK OF MENTORING AT WORK: THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRAC-
TICE (Belle Rose Ragins & Kathy E. Krarn eds., 2007).
135. See generally KATHY E. KRAm, MENTORING AT WORK: DEVELOPMENTAL RELATIONSHIPS IN
ORGANIZATIONAL LiE (1985).
136. See Monica C. Higgins, The More, the Merrier? Multiple Developmental Relationships and
Work Satisfaction, 19 J. MGMT. DEV. 277, 280-81, 289 (2000).
137. See generally Ellen A. Fagenson, The Mentor Advantage: Perceived Career/Job Experience of
Proteges Versus Non-Proteges, 10 J. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 309 (1989).
138. See Aarti Ramaswami et al., Gender, Mentoring and Career Success: The Importance of
Organizational Context, 63 PERSONAL PSYCHOL. 385, 386-87 (2010).
139. See generally George F. Dreher & Taylor H. Cox, Jr., Race, Gender, and Opportunity: A
Study of Compensation Attainment and the Establishment of Mentoring Relationships, 81 J. APPLIED
PSYCHOL. 297 (1996).
140. Ramaswami et al., supra note 138, at 386-87.
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cultures. 141 Females in these workplaces seem to be especially in
need of sponsorship and legitimacy; these are two key attributes of
powerful, visible, and connected mentors.1 42 In at least one study of
a male-dominated industry, mentoring by senior male mentors was
important for female lawyers but had little impact on the careers of
male lawyers. 143
The EEOC tends to bring high-impact discrimination cases that
involve many employees. 144 Additionally, it can bring suit despite
the employees having signed arbitration agreements, which em-
ployers increasingly require. In resolution of disputes related to
the lack of promotions or opportunities to advance, the EEOC
should require offending employers to adopt mentoring programs.
It should also urge mentorship in cases where employees have
brought successful claims of discrimination,1 45 The benefits to
women and men, and to the organizations in which they work,
make the effort worth the cost, and potentially turn an issue of con-
tention into a more fair and equitable approach to advancement in
organizations. In utilizing mentoring programs, the EEOC would
be following suggestions made by the Glass Ceiling Commission
(discussed below) as a way to advance women into senior-level
positions.
Of course, courts and arbitrators could likewise use mentoring
programs as a remedy in appropriate cases. Judges and arbitrators
should be made aware of the advantages of mentoring when dis-
crimination against women is alleged and incorporate it as part of
their tool bag of remedies. Title VII allows equitable as well as legal
(damages) remedies. 146 Mentoring programs as an equitable rem-
edy, or part of a remedy, seem well suited for Title VII disparate
treatment cases. Although a mentoring program would not be a
substitute for changes in a company's human resource policies, it
could be an additional measure that would assist women in recog-
nizing and managing barriers. Mentoring may be an even more
141. Id.
142. Schipani, et al., Pathways for Women to Obtain Positions of Organizational Leadership: The
Significance of Mentoring and Networking, 16J. GENDER L. & POLICY, 89, 101 (2009).
143. See Ramaswami et al., supra note 138, at 389.
144. See, e.g., Sam Hananel, EEOC Pursues Class-Action Strategy on Job Bias; Aim to Deter Work-
place Discrimination; Business Groups Claim Agency is Overreaching, SF.ATrLE TIMES, Aug. 19, 2012,
at D1, D5, available at http://www.highbeam.com/doc/G1-300271089.html.
145. One benefit of a mentor is to "have the mentee's back," which includes protection
from discrimination.
146. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 allowed for compensatory and punitive damages for
violations of Title VII. Previously, only equitable remedies such as hiring, reinstatement, and
lost wages and benefits were allowed. In addition, the 1991 Act allowed jury trials for inten-
tional discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2006).
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effective remedy in disparate treatment cases where, for example,
evaluation and selection criteria, including the sorts of criteria that
come into play in selecting top management, have the effect of dis-
proportionally stalling the careers of women who are otherwise
qualified for top management.
2. Regulatory Power of the OFCCP
The Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCCP) within the
Department of Labor enforces Executive Order 11246, which bars
federal government contractors from discriminating against tradi-
tionally protected groups, including women.1 47  It requires
contractors of a certain size to adopt plans to correct underutiliza-
tion of those in protected groups. 148 The plans can include goals
and timetables. 149 The employers' actions "shall include, but not be
limited to ... upgrading. .. and selection for training." 50 Under-
representation of women at management levels can be included in
this language, and contractors should include plans and goals to
address this.151 The OFCCP selectively audits contractors to deter-
mine compliance with the contractor's plans. In order to avoid
sanctions that could result from the audit, contractors must show
they have in place internal auditing systems that measure the effec-
tiveness of their plan and that they distribute and review the
effectiveness reports with management on a schedule.
Congress, in 1991, passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which pro-
vided for the establishment of the Glass Ceiling Commission.
During the four years of its existence, the Commission conducted
studies and made recommendations designed to address the issue
147. See Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (Sept. 24, 1965) (prohibiting dis-
crimination by federal government contractors).
148. Id.
149. In 2000, the OFCCP stated in conjunction with significant revision of the regulations
that the affirmative action requirements are described to include those "policies, practices,
and procedures that the contractor implements to ensure that all qualified applicants and
employees are receiving an equal opportunity for recruitment, selection, advancement, and
every other term and privilege associated with employment." Government Contractors, Af-
firmative Action Requirements, 65 Fed. Reg. 68,022, 68,035 (Nov. 13, 2000) (codified as 41
C.F.R. §§ 60-1 to -2) (emphasis added).
150. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. at 12,320.
151. In 2000, the OFCCP revised its regulations to reflect a change in focus from techni-
cal compliance to one in which a management plan was viewed as a tool to ensure equal
employment opportunity. It stated that a plan should contain practical steps to address un-
derutilization. Office of Fed. Contract Compliance Programs, Facts on Executive Order 11246-
Affirmative Action, U.S. DEP'T LAsB. (Jan. 4, 2002), http://www.dol.gov/ofccp/regs/compli-
ance/aa.htm.
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of underrepresentation of women and minorities in the workforce,
including at upper levels in organizations. The Commission, in its
two final reports, discussed mentoring as a way to overcome barriers
faced by women and minorities in advancing to senior positions.
These barriers include access to information and networking. 152
The Commission posited that if organizations increased the availa-
bility of mentorship to these groups, the groups would have greater
access to the resources they need to advance at a pace similar to
their male counterparts. 53
We argue that the OFCCP should aggressively audit contractors
to determine compliance, both in terms of the number and the
effectiveness of their plans. Where these are found wanting, it
should urge or impose mentoring programs as an effective way to
correct imbalances, especially in cases of sustained disparities.
3. SEC Actions
The SEC can also act to increase the representation of women in
the boardroom. The underrepresentation of women on boards is
significant. In the United States, approximately 14 percent of
board members are women, with many boards having none 54 even
though numerous studies have shown a strong correlation between
better financial performance and female board representation.1 55
Many countries, such as Norway and France, have established quo-
tas to speed up gender diversity on boards, and others, such as
Australia and the United Kingdom, encourage it through their cor-
porate governance codes. 156 Although the Supreme Court has
152. See generally FED. GLASS CEILING COMM'N, A SOLID INVESTMENT: MAKING FULL USE OF
THE NATION'S HUMAN CAPITAL (1995), available at http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/his-
tory/reich/reports/ceiling2.pdf. It found that women were frequently put into staff
positions that "provide little access and visibility to corporate decisionmakers .... " Id. at 14.
To counteract this, it recommended businesses implement formal mentorship programs.
153. See Leslie Kaufman-Rosen, Holes in the Glass Ceiling Theory, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 27, 1995,
at 24, available at http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/1995/03/26/holes-in-the-glass-
ceiling-theory.html.
154. Terry Morehead Dworkin et al., Career Mentoringfor Women: New Horizons/Expanded
Methods, 55 Bus. HORIZONS 363, 367 (2012).
155. Id. at 364; See, e.g., Christopher Shea, Get on Board Ladies, WALL ST. J. (WEEK IN
IDEAS), Aug. 11, 2012, at C4; NANCY M. CARTER & HARVEY M. WAGNER, CATALYST, THE BOTTOM
LINE: CORPORATE PERFORMANCE AND WOMEN'S REPRESENTATION ON BOARDS (2004-2008) 1
(2011), http://www.catalyst.org/publication/479/the-bottom-line-corporate-performance-
and-womens-representation-on-boards-20042008. Evidence also exists that there is causality.
Sonja S. Carlson, "Women Directors": A Term of Art Showcasing the Need for Meaningful Gender
Diversity on Corporate Boards, 11 SEATrLE J. Soc. JusT. 337, 346-47 (2012).
156. Carlson, supra note 155, at 359-63; see Dworkin et al., supra note 154, at 367-68.
Indeed, American female executives are increasingly serving on European company boards
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banned the adoption of affirmative action quotas, it has acknowl-
edged the benefits of diversity.1 57 The SEC can help companies and
society reap those benefits by following the lead of Australia and
the United Kingdom and strengthening the diversity reporting re-
quirements of listed companies.
In 2009, the SEC adopted a diversity disclosure requirement for
proxy statements and now requires a listed company to state
whether it used diversity as a factor in considering board candi-
dates, how it considered diversity, and the effectiveness of its
diversity policy if it had one.1 5 8 The SEC, however, purposely did
not define diversity. 159 The SEC should now use its regulatory
power to define diversity to include gender as a specific considera-
tion. This could spur more companies to adopt gender diversity
policies. In addition, it could require companies to disclose their
diversity plan if they have one and require companies that have not
adopted a plan to disclose the reasons for why they have not.16
These requirements would be consistent with the value of board
independence expressed in Sarbanes-Oxley161 and Dodd-Frank 62
and would also advance the goal of corporate boards in maximizing
shareholder wealth. 1 6 3 They would also be consistent with the rec-
ommendations of the Congressional Glass Ceiling Commission,
which looked at artificial barriers hindering advancement to mid-
and senior-level positions. 64 It recommended the implementation
of mentorship programs to help women get around barriers such as
a lack of information, visibility, and resources. 65
such as Sodexo SA, Fiat, and Logica PLC due to the "pink quotas." There are ninety-six
American women on 136 boards in twelve European countries. Joann S. Lublin, 'Pink Quotas'
Alter Europe's Boards Gender Mandates, Expertise in Hot Fields Bring Foreign Directorships to More
American Women, WALL ST. J., Sept. 12, 2012, at B8.
157. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 334 (2003).
158. See Corporate Governance, 17 C.F.R. § 229.407(c)(1)-(2) (2012).
159. Proxy Disclosure Enhancements, 74 Fed. Reg. 68,334, 68,344 (Dec. 23, 2009); Carl-
son, supra note 155, at 365.
160. See Carlson, supra note 155, at 370-71.
161. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). The Act requires independent directors on the audit
committee. Id. at 771, 775-76.
162. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376, 1618.
163. See Carlson, supra note 155, at 340. Carlson also argues that the SEC could adopt a
non-binding "Say-on-Diversity" shareholder vote rule similar to its nonbinding shareholder
vote on executive compensation reflecting the Dodd-Frank disclosure requirement on execu-
tive compensation. Id. at 374-75.
164. See generally FEO. GLASS CELING COMaM'N, supra note 152.
165. Dworkin et al., supra note 154, at 368.
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Once companies embrace diversity, mentoring programs are
likely to follow. Such programs are one of the most common tools
companies have used to help achieve diversity goals. Many compa-
nies have not responded to the current SEC action on board
diversity. One reason for the reluctance may be their fear that it
would be hard to find well-qualified candidates.1 66 A recent article
in the Wall Street Journal shows how changing facts may lay to rest
this assumption.1 67 European companies seem to be able to find
suitable women for their boards, including many American
women. 168
A focus on diversity could have another benefit-that of helping
to overcome the tokenism problem. A single member of a minority
group on a board will tend to have a limited voice. 169 Often, her
voice will be minimized and her failures magnified. Achieving "crit-
ical mass" not only garners credibility for the individuals involved,
but also helps overcome "groupthink.' 170 Some have posited that
homogeneity and the resultant groupthink contributed to the fi-
nancial crisis.' 71 At a minimum, a critical mass will help lead to
diversity of opinion, which, in turn, tends to result in more in-
formed decisions and, often, better financial performance.1 72
The SEC could also play a role in helping to overcome the de-
cades-long wage disparity experienced by women. Women still only
earn approximately three-quarters of what men earn. 73 The Dodd-
166. See Carlson, supra note 155, at 369 (citing PRICEWATERHOuSECooPERs LLP, ANNUAL
CORPORATE DIRECTORS SURVEY 2011 FINDINGS: BOARDS RESPOND TO STAKEHOLDER CONCERNS
18 (2011), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_.US/us/corporate-governance/assets/an-
nual-corporate-director-survey-201 l.pdf).
167. Joann S. Lublin & Kelly Eggers, More Women Are Primed to Land CEO Roles: In the U.S.,
a Strong Pipeline of Female Senior Executives Means a Larger Pool Eyed by Recruiters, WALL ST. J.,
Apr. 30, 2012, at B1 (detailing the ten top women considered to be a likely pick for a CEO
position in the next five years after polling fifteen search firms, executive coaches, and
women's organizations).
168. See Lublin, supra note 167.
169. See Mariatersa Torchina et al., Women Directors on Corporate Boards: From Tokenism to
Critical Mass, 102J. Bus. ETHics 299, 302 (2011).
170. See ROSABETH Moss KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (Basic Books
1977); Torchina et al., supra note 169.
171. Nicki Gilmour, Why Accountability Is What Matters: Achieving Critical Mass with Targets
or Quotas, THE GLASS HAMMER (Jan. 21, 2010, 6:00 AM), http://www.theglasshammer.com/
news/2010/01/21/why-accountability-is-what-matters-achieving-critical-mass-with-targets-or-
quotas; Carlson, supra note 155, at 343.
172. For example, a recent study involving 1,500 American companies during the period
from 1992-2006 found that women in management just below the CEO level had a signifi-
cant positive impact on companies involved in research and development. Rebecca Tuhus-
Dubrow, The Female Advantage, BOSTON.COM (May 3, 2009), http://www.boston.com/boston-
globe/ ideas/articles/2009/05/03/ the femaleadvantage/.
173. David Jackson & Mimi Hall, Women Gain in Education and Longevity, U.S.A. TODAY,
Mar. 2, 2011, at 5A.
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Frank law included a pay equity disclosure provision, but the SEC
has not yet written its implementing rule.1 7 4 The provision is de-
signed to give investors information about pay disparity so they can
better evaluate the company by requiring companies to disclose the
median pay of their CEO and of their employees. A large gap "can
affect employee morale, productivity and turnover.1 75 If the SEC
effectively implements the provision and if shareholders act on the
disclosed information, the provision could put pressure on compa-
nies to reduce the gap. Because women are disproportionally at the
lower end of pay disparities, any resulting raise would help narrow
the gender disparity gap.
D. Government Contracts
Another possible means of ameliorating gender-based employ-
ment discrimination would be to preferentially award government
procurement and services contracts to businesses that have superior
track records for treating women properly.176 For example, govern-
ment entities could preferentially award contracts to businesses that
have had fewer complaints filed with the EEOC, have mentoring
programs open to all employees already in place, and have a higher
proportion of women in leadership positions. Moreover, there are
legitimate business reasons for government entities to prefer to do
business with companies that treat women better, as studies have
repeatedly shown that gender diversity in upper management is
good for business.177 This preference would give companies an in-
centive to treat their female employees better and proactively
implement mentoring programs to help them. This form of incen-
tive would have the added benefit of producing a more organic,
informal mentoring system that is designed to truly achieve results,
174. Leslie Kwoh, Firms Resist New Pay-Equity Rules, WALL ST. J., June 27, 2012, at B8.
175. Id. (citing several studies). It encourages whistleblowers to come forward with infor-
mation of wrongdoing in the financial markets by providing them with large rewards and
broadly protects them from retaliation when they provide useful and original information.
§ 748; 7 U.S.C. § 26(b) (2006). Further, Dodd-Frank amended the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (also
designed to prevent financial crises) by precluding enforcement of mandatory pre-dispute
arbitration agreements. Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of
15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
176. See Ryan Edmonds, The Glass Ceiling's Silver Bullet? Public Procurement as a Regulatory
Solution to Gender Discrimination in Executive Employment (April 10, 2011), Paper Presented to
the 48th Annual Canadian Industrial Relations Association Conference: New Ideas about
Work and Workers, Fredericton, New Brunswick, June 2-4, 2011, available at http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1845993.
177. E.g., Dworkin et al., supra note 154, at 364.
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rather than a mentoring system that merely meets the terms of a
settlement agreement.
E. Arbitration Agreements
A large number of employers now require that applicants agree
that they will arbitrate all disputes and not bring orjoin class action
suits as a condition to employment. In order to facilitate suits that
further important public policies, Congress has barred the enforce-
ment of such pre-hire agreements in certain instances, including
some involving Title VII. Under the Department of Defense Appro-
priations Act of 2010, contractors with contracts of more than $1
million must agree not to enter into or enforce existing contracts
that require arbitration of any Title VII claim or any tort related to
sexual harassment or assault.178 Further, the contractor must certify
that it has required the same of subcontractors with contracts in
excess of $1 million. 179
A similar prohibition can be seen in the recently-enacted Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,180 passed
after the financial crisis of 2008, which includes provisions that pro-
mote whistleblowing and protect whistleblowers. Part of that
encouragement and protection involves prohibiting the enforce-
ment of arbitration agreements, thereby allowing whistleblowers to
sue when they suffer retaliation.'" The Department of Labor has
also refused to enforce agreements not to sue in FLSA cases. 18 2
Likewise, to further the long-standing and important public policy
of preventing and remedying discrimination, Congress should bar
enforcement of mandatory pre-dispute class action and arbitration
agreements. 18 3
Some commentators, however, have argued that the backlash
against mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agreements has been
178. Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118,
§ 8116(a)(1), 123 Stat. 3409, 46-47 (2009), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
BILLS-Il1 h r3326en r/pdf/BILLS-1 11 hr3326enr.pdf.
179. Id. at § 8116(b).
180. Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376.
181. § 922(e)(2); 18 U.S.C. 1514A(e)(2) (2006).
182. Steven Greenhouse, Labor Board Supports Class Action For Workers, N.Y. TimEs, Jan. 12,
2012, at BI. But see Owen v. Bristol Care, Inc., 702 F.3d 1050 (8th Cir. 2013) (finding a class
action waiver enforceable in FLSA case).
183. Whistleblowing is essentially an individual act, so no such bar was needed in promot-
ing whistleblowing.
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overzealous.1 84 Admittedly, a large portion of the distrust of em-
ployment arbitration stems from negative stereotypes of employers
as evil or biased, when in reality many employers implement pre-
dispute arbitration agreements in good faith and with the best of
intentions. 185 To be sure, pre-dispute arbitration agreements can
sometimes resolve workplace issues more effectively than the judi-
cial system, 186 and arbitration continues to be a less expensive,
faster dispute resolution process than litigation in many
circumstances.
Many of these efficiency benefits, however, are lost in a class ac-
tion context. 87 Additionally, arbitration is not precedential and
does not develop or advance the case law, which is a critical disad-
vantage when it comes to gender discrimination disputes, an area
of law that is still in need of significant progression. Moreover, arbi-
tration greatly restricts the opportunity to appeal decisions; for
corporate bodies in routine contract disputes, the increased effi-
ciency is worth the risk of limiting appeals, but for victims of
discrimination with one opportunity at restitution, it frequently is
not. Thus, in order to maintain the benefits of pre-dispute arbitra-
tion while still developing case law and assuring fair and efficient
adjudication, the bar on mandatory pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments could be limited to employment discrimination cases
involving class actions.
As noted above, educated observers anticipate that the holding
in Dukes will severely hamper the ability of victims of sexual discrim-
ination in the workplace to redress the wrongs they have suffered.
It should be further noted that the holding of Dukes also has impli-
cations for the viability of the class action procedure generally.
184. Beth M. Primm, Comment, A Critical Look at the EEOC'S Policy Against Mandatory Pre-
Dispute Arbitration Agreements, 2 U. Pa. J. Lab. & Emp. L. 151, 163 (1999) ("While the justifica-
tions offered by the EEOC against the enforcement of mandatory arbitration agreements
appear facially compelling, further inquiry shows that they are overzealous, unsubstantiated,
or at the least, questionable.").
185. Id. at 174 ("[T]he EEOC is unnecessarily excluding every private employer, regard-
less of good faith or intention, from establishing a useful role in the implementation and
furtherance of employment law principles."). See generally id. at 172-77 (discussing how the
EEOC's opposition to mandatory arbitration systems are premised on an unfair view of em-
ployers and arbitrators).
186. Id. at 163 ("[M]andatory arbitration agreements, if obtained through informed con-
sent and reasonable methods, can actually achieve the goals that most individual claimants
would cite as fundamental to employment law-restoring, retaining, and revitalizing em-
ployee power and dignity in the workplace-better than court adjudication.").
187. SeeAT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1751 (2011) (discussing how
moving from bilateral arbitration to class action arbitration sacrifices the traditional benefits
of arbitration, making the process "slower, more costly, and more likely to generate procedu-
ral morass than final judgment").
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Although a detailed analysis of class action litigation in contexts
other than employment discrimination is beyond the scope of this
Article, we further urge (1) narrow construction of Dukes in class
action litigation generally, (2) statutory reform which would restore
the rights of parties who have been harmed to utilize the class ac-
tion procedure where Congress sees it as appropriate, and (3)
action by regulatory agencies in administrative procedures to fash-
ion remedies to lessen the effects of Dukes where parties have shown
harm worthy of redress. 188
CONCLUSION
What's the point in pouring a fortune into educating girls, and
then watching them exceed boys at almost every level, if, when
it comes to appointing business leaders in top companies,
these are drawn from just half the population-friends who
have been recruited on fishing and hunting trips or from
within a small circle of acquaintances? 189
In 2011, women made up 46.6 percent of the labor force. 190 But
in the corporate world, for example, only 16.6 percent of the board
members of Fortune 500 companies are female.' 91 Similarly,
women made up 45.4 percent of associates in the nation's major
law firms but represent only 19.5 percent of the partners in these
firms. 92 Women still earn seventy-seven cents on a man's dollar by
the latest census conducted in 2008.193 The number drops to 68
188. The authors recognize that law regarding Rule 23 and the commonality require-
ment has developed differently depending on the subject matter of the litigation. For
example, one of the authors has previously criticized the court's denial of class certification
in the context of securities litigation brought by the bondholders of the American Interna-
tional Group (AIG). In re Am. Int'l Grp. Sec. Litig., 265 F.R.D. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The
commonality requirement in securities law class action litigation can be met with proof that
securities traded in an efficient market. See Michael Hartzmark, Cindy A. Schipani, H. Nejat
Seyhun, Fraud on the Market: Analysis of the Efficiency of the Corporate Bond Market, 2011 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 654, 657, 662 (2011).
189. Gilmour, supra note 171 (quoting Ansgar Gabrielsen, the Norwegian Minister of
Trade, who drafted the gender diversity quota legislation for boards); Carlson, supra note
155, at 337.
190. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE STATISTICS FROM THE CURRENT POPULA-
TION SuRvEY, available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/cpsaat03.htm (last updated Feb. 5, 2013).
191. CATALYST, supra note 6.
192. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, A CURRENT GLANCE AT WOMEN IN THE LAw 2011 1
(2011), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/marketing/women/current
glancestatistics_2011 .authcheckdam.pdf.
193. Laura Fitzpatrick, Why Do Women Still Earn Less Than Men , TIME, Apr. 20, 2010, at 1,
available at http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1983185,00.html.
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percent for African-American women and 58 percent for Latinas.194
These numbers suggest that discrimination in the workplace is still
a significant problem. Yet, in light of Dukes, employees may become
discouraged from bringing claims if the class action procedure is
effectively unavailable. Regulators and Congress should step up and
take actions to help advance the important public policy of creating
a level playing field in employment.
During the presidential race of 2012, women and Hispanics were
identified as groups crucial to a candidate's success. The changes
we suggest cannot be achieved without leadership from the top.
The heads of the agencies are political appointees and those ap-
pointees reflect the focus of their appointer. Whether the focus on
women will be carried beyond the election cannot be determined at
this point. To the extent, however, that these groups are truly seen
as crucial constituencies, the actions we suggest are more likely to
be achieved.
194. Id.
